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Abstract
In the core chapters 4–6, Iacona (2018) argues against the “Unique-
ness Thesis” (UT), stating that “there is a unique notion of logical form 
that fulfils both the logical role and the semantic role” (39), where 
the former “concerns the formal explanation of logical properties and 
logical relations, such as validity or contradiction” (37), and the lat-
ter “concerns the formulation of a compositional theory of meaning” 
(ibid.). He argues for this on the basis of relations of coreference among 
referential expressions, names and indexicals. From what I take to be 
a fundamental agreement on most relevant issues, here I will nonethe-
less press him to clarify the notions of intrinsicness and the logical and 
semantic role of logical form on which he relies.
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1 Introduction
Iacona (2018) argues in the core chapters 4–6 against the “Unique-
ness Thesis” (UT), stating that “there is a unique notion of logical 
form that fulfils both the logical role and the semantic role” (39), 
where the former concerns “the formal explanation of logical prop-
erties and logical relations, such as validity or contradiction” (37), 
and the latter “the formulation of a compositional theory of mean-
ing” (ibid.). UT is supposed to be motivated by another claim, “in-
trinsicalism” (I), the view that “there is a unique intrinsicalist notion 
of logical form that fulfils both the logical role and the semantic role” 
(40). An intrinsicalist notion, he further tells us, is one that “assumes 
that logical form is determined by intrinsic properties of sentences” 
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(40); where “intrinsic properties of s […] are invariant properties 
that s possesses independently of how it is used in this or that con-
text, whereas others are extrinsic properties of s, in that they may 
depend on how s is used in this or that context” (37). He argues that 
there are two notions of logical form, a “syntactic” one that accords 
with (I) and is adequate to play the semantic role, and a different, 
“semantic” one that is at odds with (I) and is the one that fulfils the 
logical role. In different passages, though, Iacona allows that some 
intrinsicalist views deploy a “semantic” notion of logical form; he 
mentions among them (45) the one I myself have advanced (García-
Carpintero 1993, 2003, 2004): “any view according to which logical 
form is determined by intrinsic properties of sentences—syntactic 
or semantic—may be classified as a version of intrinsicalism” (46).
Iacona’s arguments for this claim depend on what I take to be logi-
cal properties of relations of de jure (or internal) coreference (Fine 2007, 
Schroeter 2012), involving context-dependent expressions like in-
dexicals and proper names, a topic that I have discussed in previous 
work (García-Carpintero 2004, 2014). The way Iacona appears to 
understand these issues (but, as the following pages will make clear, 
I am not sure I have understood it) suggests to me that he agrees 
to a large extent with Fodor (2008), Fiengo and May (2006), Heck 
(2012), Sainsbury and Tye (2012), Pryor (2017), and Schroeter and 
Schroeter (2016), who support deflationary, “syntactic” accounts of 
de jure coreference, in terms of a (syntactic) notion of logical form. 
As Sainsbury and Tye (2012: 87) put it, “data are to be explained by 
sameness and differences in vehicles of content, rather than same-
ness and differences in content”. In contrast, Fine (2007) and Re-
canati (2013, 2016) offer a (by some measures: see below) semantic 
account, and I (2004, 2014) have argued for another one, aiming 
at sufficiently capturing the “transparency” claims that Iacona also 
rejects (§§6.4, 6.6). I’ll proceed as follows: I will start by outlining 
my own account of these matters, as developed elsewhere (§2); then 
I’ll use that background to raise some concerns. As I have already 
indicated, my aim is mostly clarificatory; I am really unsure whether 
we disagree.
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2 De jure coreference and logical form
Frege posed his well-known problem of cognitive significance (which 
is behind the issues I want to raise) for identity sentences, but, as 
many commentators have pointed out,1 this is done just for conve-
nience. Sentences of the forms a=a and a=b have different seman-
tically significant properties, even when both are true: the former 
are a priori (in fact—and in my view this is what is truly semanti-
cally significant—a priori because analytic) while the latter are not. 
By “semantically significant” I mean that they are a crucial piece of 
data for a semantic theory to explain, and thus crucial tests for the 
adequacy of semantic theories (cf. Yalcin 2014). But the same applies 
to a is F and b is F, even when a and b co-refer: the former logically 
(and hence, in my view, analytically, which again is what I take to be 
a semantically significant feature) follows from a is F, while the latter 
does not. Like Iacona, I will have in mind the more general issue, but 
I’ll focus mostly on identity sentences for convenience.
On a narrowly syntactic version of (I), the form of true identity 
sentences is determined by orthographic shape; on this view, same-
ness of expression is being understood in terms of sameness of form 
(plus perhaps sameness of referent). Let us call this the narrowly syn-
tactic (‘NS’) characterization of form. As Iacona notices, given NS 
there are no significant differences between a=a and a=b; for, as 
Kripke’s (1979) ‘Paderewski’ example illustrates, a true identity of 
the first form might require contextual information to establish it as 
much as one of the second (77–8, 82–3).
Let me present in contrast my own alternative view on logical 
form, which appeals to what I will call the internal coreference (‘IC’) 
criterion. Let us assume that an argument expressed in a natural 
language is logically valid if it has a valid correct formalization in a 
formal language (which at least agrees in wording with the proposal 
Iacona’s relies on, 60), and consider the English sentence (1):
(1) Hesperus equals itself.
Is formula (2) a correct first-order formalization of it?
(2) a = a
1 Cf., e.g., Heck 2012: 155–6, and references there.
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By allowing it to be so, we can count (1) as logically valid, in that 
there is a correct formalization of it in first-order logic with identity 
that is formally valid. This looks like an intuitively correct result; 
however, under NS the answer should be negative. It is a syntactic 
feature of (2) that it includes expressions of the same type at two dif-
ferent syntactic positions in the sentence’s structure. In that respect, 
it differs from (3):
(3) a = b
(3), on the other hand, would count as a correct formalization of, 
say, (4) below, which is not logically valid because a correct formal-
ization such as (3) is not first-order valid, and no alternative correct 
first-order-valid formalization appears to exist (against what Iacona 
suggests, 78–80: we’ll come back to this):
(4) Hesperus equals Phosphorus.
The more general problem for NS now appears manifest: given it, 
(3) appears to provide the correct formalization of (1), in that the 
relevant traits of (1) for that criterion are those that it shares with (4), 
namely, it features co-referential expressions of different types oc-
cupying the subject- and object-positions of the verb ‘equals’. Thus, 
given NS, (1) does not share its logical form with the (one sentence) 
arguments correctly formalized by (2), and therefore should not 
count as logically valid. What this suggests is that NS misses what 
is really relevant to determining logical validity, which is not a nar-
rowly syntactic feature (the one (1) shares not with (2), but with (3)). 
Instead, (2), given the expressive conventions of the formal language 
in which it is couched, conveys the existence of a semantic relation 
of anaphoric dependence of the second occurrence of ‘a’ on the lat-
ter, which in natural languages is sometimes expressed in the same 
way as in the formal language to which (2) belongs, but which, as (1) 
shows, can be expressed in different ways.
I have made this point with an example involving a reflexive pro-
noun as our anaphoric expression. There are strict linguistic con-
straints (articulated by principles A and B of Binding Theory) re-
quiring that reflexives like ‘itself’ in (1) be interpreted as anaphoric 
relative to ‘Hesperus’, and foreclosing that repeating ‘Hesperus’ 
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could have the same effect.2 However, the point can also be made by 
means of examples without this feature. Consider, for instance, (5):
(5) If Hesperus equals Phosphorus, then it is visible in the morn-
ing.
There is no linguistic requirement that ‘it’ in (5) be interpreted as 
anaphoric with respect to ‘Hesperus’. It is rather a pragmatic matter 
whether, in a given utterance, it should be understood that way, or 
as anaphoric relative to ‘Phosphorus’ instead, or rather as referring 
to another, contextually specified object. Still, if the former is the 
case, given what I take to be an adequate conception of logical form 
(García-Carpintero 2004) there is no question but that (6) is a cor-
rect first-order formalization—one counting as valid the inference 
from (4) and (5) to ‘Hesperus is visible in the morning’:
(6) a = b → P(a)
The reason is (as I would put it, cf. García-Carpintero 2004) that 
what we formalize is a topic-neutral (a “logical constant”, one might 
say) constituent of what is understood, independently of the means 
(syntactic, pragmatic or whatever) by means of which that under-
standing occurs. This topic-neutral component is the one expressing 
the relation of anaphoric dependence, which philosophers writing 
on the topic give different names, such as “internal” or “de jure” co-
reference.3 But NS misses this, and therefore the criterion for when 
two co-referential expression “count as the same name” does not al-
2 In a real utterance of ‘Hesperus equals Hesperus’ (outside the rarefied realm 
of hackneyed philosophical examples), the second occurrence of ‘Hesperus’ is 
understood as not dependent on the first, even though the terms are, of course, 
presented as in fact co-referential. Perhaps, for instance, two different naming 
practices associated with the expression-type are assumed in the context, rela-
tive to which the identity is asserted: “(that) Hesperus is (that other) Hesperus”. 
Perry (1988: 242n) appreciates this point; Schroeter (2007) also acknowledges 
it on p. 599, but she seems to think that there are “standard” contexts in which 
the sentence would be understood as having logical form (2). I take it that this 
only happens in philosophical contexts; in truly standard ones, (3) provides its 
correct formalization.
3 Perry (1988) and Lawlor (2010) use the first, Schroeter (2007) and Pinillos 
(2011) the second. Fine (2007: 40, 68) speaks instead of objects “being repre-
sented as the same”.
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low us to capture the relation of sameness of form that is required to 
properly account for validity.
It is easy to see that the issue I have discussed in the previous para-
graphs is just a generalization of the one Frege poses at the beginning 
of “On Sense and Reference”. The issue is this: we have precisely de-
fined notions of logical validity, such as the Tarskian model-theoretic 
one presupposed above applying to arguments in formal languages 
like those including (2), (3) and (6). However, to the extent that they 
are compelling, this is because they offer good explications of a pre-
theoretical notion applying to arguments involving natural language 
sentences such as (1), (4) and (5), and, indeed, the thoughts they 
express.4 This is a pre-theoretical notion of logical validity, para-
digmatically one that semantic theories (broadly conceived) are sup-
posed to account for; it is a manifestly semantically relevant property, 
in the previously canvassed sense.5
Now, the Fregean picture is a class of such broadly semantic theo-
ries, and hence it is to be expected that Fregeans will want to invoke 
their proprietary theoretical notions for that purpose. Thus: logical 
validity is logical truth-preservation, and this requires preservation 
of reference of the sort illustrated by (2) and (6), i.e., the one cap-
tured in formal languages (but not, as we have seen, in natural lan-
guage) in the way the criterion NS allows for. The Fregean will say 
that this common “sort” will ultimately consist in that the referent of 
one expression is understood to be determined by the same sense as 
the referent of the other.
As we have seen, the inference formalized as Fa ∴ Fa, in contrast 
to the one formalized as Fa ∴ Fb, is valid and non-enthymematic; 
the suggestion that it is enthymematic—i.e., that there is an im-
plicit third identity premise identifying the referent of the subjects 
of the other two—would launch us into a regress (cf. Heck 2012: 
4 García-Carpintero (1993, 2003, 2004) substantiates this claim.
5 Semantics narrowly conceived aims to explain the sort of issues about lan-
guage acquisition, etc., that a Principle of Compositionality is intended to deal 
with, on the view that García-Carpintero (2012) articulates. As (5) suggests, 
it may well be that an adequate account of intuitive validity should go beyond 
the proprietary resources of this theoretical undertaking, allowing itself to use 
more “pragmatic” notions.
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154–5, and Recanati 2013: 47–50 for recent discussions, and refer-
ences therein). The claim formalized as a=a, as opposed to the one 
formalized as a=b, is similarly valid. External co-reference is hence 
not sufficient for the relation that in formal languages is captured by 
identity of type.6 Identity of type of the representational device—
which is what NS provides as a condition—is not sufficient either, 
nor is it necessary, as the examples above show. What manifests the 
presence of the relation of de jure or internal co-reference is rather 
an epistemic property, certainly not easy to explain but clearly in 
the vicinity of the properties that Frege mentioned,7 which different 
writers have tried to capture in slightly different terms:
First, … the co-reference strikes you as obvious in the sense that no 
calculation or reflection is required before you’re willing to treat the 
two uses of ‘Bush’ as co-referential (contrast: ‘54=7+47’). Second, … 
the co-reference strikes you as rationally incontrovertible: you couldn’t 
imagine how it could turn out that Bush isn’t Bush … (Schroeter 2007: 
600; cf. also Schroeter 2012: sec. 1.)
… a good test of when an object is represented as the same is in terms 
of whether one might sensibly raise the question of whether it is the 
same. An object is represented as the same in a piece of discourse only 
if no one who understands the discourse can sensibly raise the question 
of whether it is the same. (Fine 2007: 40)
Any competent speaker who fully understands [(5)] will know of the 
italicized occurrence that if they manage to refer, then they refer to the 
same thing. (Pinillos 2011: 305)
Acknowledging the relation identified by these epistemic criteria—
obtaining between, say, ‘it’ and ‘Hesperus’ in (5)—does not require 
the acceptance of any Fregean tenets. To agree that such a relation 
obtains and stands in need of explanation requires only the minimal 
self-awareness involved in detecting data for semantic theorizing. It 
6 In fact, external co-reference is not necessary either, as shown by the cases 
of confusion discussed in the literature already referred to; cf., e.g., Schroeter 
2007 and Lawlor 2010.
7 Frege mentions apriority, but this is puzzling; he surely accepts that 9=32 has 
the form a=b (the two expressions have different senses), even though the identity 
is a priori.
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is just one more factor we have to reckon with in properly account-
ing for rational assessment and rationalizing explanations of our acts, 
including mental acts such as judging, deciding or inferring.
The clearest proof that such an acknowledgement does not beg 
any questions in favor of a Fregean picture is that one can pre-theo-
retically identify the relation in the way just suggested, and then go 
on to provide a non-Fregean account. Thus, for instance, although 
Heck’s (2012) general outlook is sympathetic to Fregeanism, he 
summarizes his proposal—which essentially involves recognizing 
the sort of “formal” relations highlighted above—thus: “I have ar-
gued … that the notion of sense is not needed for the solution to 
Frege’s puzzle” (op. cit., 172). Fine (2007) provides an account in 
terms of “semantic (or, more generally, representational) requirements”, 
stating facts “which belong to the semantics of a given language” (or 
to a theory of representational states) (op. cit., 50)—the class of facts 
to be predicted or explained by such theories. The account is sup-
posed to be entirely compatible with a Millian picture, barring any 
role for Fregean senses. Pinillos (2011: 317–22) offers a similarly re-
lational account in terms of a primitive relation of “p-linking”, which 
he characterizes by means of four axioms. In support of Millianism, 
he offers an argument against any theory which purports to explain 
coreference by ascribing a common item to the coreferring terms, be 
it a Fregean sense, a mental file, or whatever; the argument depends 
on the fact that such theories would characterize de jure coreference 
as an equivalence relation, whereas, he argues, it is not transitive.8
The alternative to NS that I am suggesting appeals to what I 
named above the internal co-reference criterion, IC. On this alterna-
tive, we have identity of names (or, better, terms or referential ex-
pressions in general) in the required sense when one anaphoric depends 
on the other in the way we have highlighted, as established by criteria 
like the ones offered by Schroeter, Fine, and Pinillos I have quoted 
above. IC differs from NS, because it does not rely on identity of 
type plus external coreference. It does not assume, say, that Fregean 
senses are required for an adequate characterization of the data to be 
accounted for.
8 I do not find the argument compelling; cf. the discussion by Recanati (2013: 
104–12) and Goodsell (2014: 310).
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Of course, important philosophical questions remain to be an-
swered. To me, a most interesting one is whether, in order to fully 
explain the anaphoric dependence relations that a proper presentation 
of Frege’s puzzle must mention, we must appeal to Fregean senses. 
By a “full explanation” I mean the sort of first-personally intelligible 
account of our rational assessments and rationalizing explanations 
that Fregeans aspire to provide. In previous work (García-Carpintero 
2000, 2018) I have defended a form of the Fregean picture that I take 
to be immune to Millian arguments. This proposal agrees with Mil-
lians that the content of the assertions made with (1) and (5), and of 
the attitudes they express, are just singular propositions individuated 
by the referents of the singular terms. I argue, however, that a full 
account of the relevant states/acts requires accompanying reference-
fixing acts of presupposing. Both Pinillos (2011: 308) and Goodsell 
(2014: 296–7) contend that we cannot account for anaphoric depen-
dence in such terms. I believe that their arguments can be answered, 
and that here too the presuppositional account is in a position to vin-
dicate the need for a full-fledged Fregean account. Equally impor-
tant in this respect would be to deal with the objections presented 
by Schroeter (2012), also in the context of accounting for anaphoric 
dependencies, to the sort of “two-dimensional” account I envisage. 
However, these are tasks for another occasion.
3 Questions for Iacona
With this background, I now go back to Iacona’s discussion, and to 
my goal of raising questions for him to clarify. He makes much of con-
trasting arguments involving names (cases 1–4, 46–7) with similar 
arguments with indexicals replacing them (cases 5–8, 48–9). This 
might be ok if one is confronting narrowly syntactic views like NS 
above, but we both agree they should be rejected. I think we agree 
that, in the case of both indexicals and proper names, reasonings 
involving expressions with the same shape may have to be rendered 
in adequate formalizations with different constants in formal lan-
guages; we disagree whether this applies to ‘Paderewski’ in Kripke’s 
example, but we agree if different Paderewskis are really meant. We 
also agree in the other direction; items involving expressions with 
different shapes may in both cases (names and indexicals) be for-
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malized with one and the same constant (‘I’/’you’, ‘Aristotle’/‘The 
Stagirite’ in some contexts, 48, 74–5). On the other hand, given his 
definition of ‘intrinsic property’ quoted at the outset, and what I said 
above about the de jure coreference relation, it should be obvious that 
I also reject intrinsicalism; for, when it comes to the cases that Iacona 
discusses (involving both names and indexicals), what counts as an 
adequate formalization depends on my view on contextual matters.
However, firstly, I don’t see how it follows from this that I should 
go along with Iacona’s rejection of (UT), given the way he states 
the distinction between the logical and the semantic roles of logical 
form. Certainly, like most contemporary semanticists, I think we 
need a distinction (due to Dummett and Lewis, later elaborated in 
great detail by others, see for instance Yalcin 2014, and further refer-
ences there), between what is nowadays usually called semantic con-
tent (meaning ascribed by grammar to linguistic types) and assertoric 
content (meaning determined in context by semantic content plus re-
quired contextual elements).9 Features of natural language like sys-
tematicity or productivity that are supposed to be explained by com-
positionality depend on the former, while logical validity depends on 
the latter, because it is truth-preservation under certain constraints, 
and typically only assertoric contents get truth-values. But I suppose 
this is not enough to reject (UT), otherwise we wouldn’t need Ia-
cona’s arguments based on his cases. Besides, assertoric contents, 
the way I have characterized them, crucially depend on semantic 
contents, which in my view provides support for some sort of unic-
ity—or at least robust metaphysical connections—between the logical 
and the semantic notions of logical form.
This leads me to the second question or doubt I wanted to raise. 
As I said, the clearest disagreement I have with Iacona concerns is-
sues of transparency. However, strictly speaking, there is no dis-
agreement here either; for I agree with him that logical validity is not 
9 I have characterized semantic content as character content (García-Carpintero 
2006). As Kratzer puts the same idea: “Words, phrases and sentences acquire 
content when we utter them on particular occasions. What that content is may 
differ from one context to the next. It is the task of semantics to describe all those 
features of the meaning of a linguistic expression that stay invariable in what-
ever context the expression may be used. This invariable element is the meaning 
proper of an expression” (Kratzer 2012: 4).
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a transparent matter, in Boghossian’s sense. Although I haven’t elabo-
rated on this here, this is because I agree that cases like Boghossian’s 
‘Pavarotti’ (72) show that a rational thinker may fail to appreciate 
the validity of an argument, or wrongly judge valid an invalid one.10 
However, I fail to see the need to take this as far as Iacona wants—
to insist that ‘Hesperus equals Phosphorus’ is a valid claim (78–9). 
That view would be excluded by any account that acknowledges a 
logical and semantic role to relations of de jure coreference; and I fail 
to see in Iacona’s discussion and distinctions any reason to put them 
aside. I have only found a passage in his discussion (p. 50) where 
he appears to tackle something like this issue. He considers there 
the “appeal to indexed syntactic items”, which is the way anaphoric 
relations are represented in contemporary semantic theories. But 
the argument he provides there only shows that the relevant relation 
cannot be an “intrinsic” one in his sense, i.e., a context-independent 
one—something with which I fully agree, as I made clear above. I 
thus cannot find any reason to disregard the significance of the ex-
pression of de jure coreference relations to these matters, and hence 
to accept Iacona’s identification for present purposes of ‘Hesperus 
equals Phosphorus’ with ‘Hesperus equals itself’.11
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